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RESTRUCTURING THE MULTILATERAL
EXPORT CONTROL REGIME SYSTEM
Daniel H. Joyner*
ABSTRACT
This article identifies a current disharmony arising from increased expectations for the
effectiveness and scope of the multilateral non-proliferation export control regime system,
coupled with the reality of regime structures the inherent institutional limitations of which
form significant barriers to meeting these expectations. The article will propose that,
through employing international legal and organisational theory, this disharmony can
be substantially mediated, and that the expectations of the multilateral non-proliferation
community can be essentially met through efforts of reform and restructuring of the
multilateral export control regimes. These efforts, while endowing the regimes with the
increased formality necessary for higher levels of effectiveness, at the same time do not
present the serious challenges to notions of state sovereignty that have contributed to the
current unwillingness of regime members to institute programmes of reform within the
regimes.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the recent coalition action in Iraq, attention among international lawyers
interested in the system for normative ordering of international security relation-
ships, has largely been focused on the arguments for and against the establishment
of preemptive strike principles in both national security policy and international
law to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The
maintenance and legitimacy of such a principle, it is argued by some, are necessary
to protect against the threats arising from such proliferation, including the acqui-
sition and use of such technologies by states and non-state actors perceived to pose
a threat to international peace and security.
While such arguments, and the exigencies presented by perceivedly hostile
states already in possession of destabilising quantities of WMD related material
upon which they are based, are of interest and worthy of thorough study, they are
not the focus of this article. This treatment will rather examine what is herein
argued to be an even more important element in the overall programme of national
and multilateral non-proliferation efforts than the doctrine of preemption - timely
and effective prevention.
Benjamin Franklin noted in his Poor Richard's Almanac that 'an ounce of
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prevention is worth a pound of cure'. Although it is safe to assume that he never
dreamed of the relevance of this classical maxim to modern security realities, its
sage message is perfectly applicable. After all, it has become abundantly clear
through revelations in the last decade that the lax export control standards of both
national and multilateral regulatory frameworks contributed significantly to the
development of the clandestine Iraqi WMD programme, which has been a primary
cause of two multi-national wars in 12 years aimed at containing the threat per-
ceivedly produced thereby.' Due in part to these revelations and to the attacks of
11 September 2001, a number of important members of the international com-
munity have now pledged their resources to a perennial 'war on terrorism', with the
explicit purpose of eliminating potential sources of WMD proliferation threat. And
while current security imperatives may well justify this emphasis on active and
invasive counterproliferation initiatives, it would be well for the international com-
munity to remember that had more comprehensive and effective preventive
measures, in the form of more developed export control regulatory frameworks,
been in place at both national and multilateral levels, such a high level of continu-
ing expenditures of resources and lives for the cause of security might not now be
necessary.
These preventive frameworks will be the subject of the balance of this study.
The multilateral export control regimes, which will be defined and discussed in
detail later on, in particular have the potential to contribute significantly to the
maintenance of a more harmonized and efficient overall non-proliferation regime
at both the national and international levels, and thereby to the preventive pro-
gramme of the international community in the area of WMD related materials and
technology and their proliferation to hostile or terrorist entities.2 The regimes have,
however, been criticised in recent years as ineffective in performing their core roles
of promulgating norms and facilitating co-ordination and co-operation among
member states in the area of export control law and policy. This treatment will
examine these claims of inefficiency and will seek both to provide commentary on
their substance, and, more importantly, will propose means of institutional restruc-
turing within the current multilateral export control regime system to remedy
existing regime shortcomings.
As a policy matter, detailed study of the multilateral export control regimes and
proposals for their strengthening could hardly be of more pressing and timely
1 J. Holmes & G. Bertsch, 'Tighten Export Controls', Defense News (5 May 2003).
2 On the role that export controls can play in non-proliferation efforts as well as the
limitations of export controls see K. Bailey, 'Nonproliferation Export Controls: Problems
and Alternatives' in K. Bailey and R. Rudney (eds.), Proliferation and Export Controls
(1993); US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Export Controls and
Nonproliferation Policy (May 1994), OTA-ISS-596; Final Report of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology (December 1999); National Academy of Sciences,
Elements of a New Response: Multilateral Export Control Regimes, Finding Common
Ground: US Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (1991); R. Cupitt,
Multilateral Nonproliferation Export Control Arrangements in 2000: Achievements,
Challenges and Reform (September 2000).
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importance as they bear on the maintenance and improvement of one vital arrow
in the quiver of the international community's non-proliferation efforts. From a
theoretical perspective as well, however, these regimes are interesting examples of
continuously functioning international soft law arrangements, which while based
upon non-binding foundational documents yet have elements of institutional struc-
ture such as regularised meetings, sophisticated information sharing networks and
procedures for continuing norm generation. In the context of these policy argu-
ments, therefore, this treatment will also examine some modem thinking in both
international legal theory and international relations theory, and utilise these
understandings both to explain the character of the regimes more fully as well as in
making proposals for the future direction of the regimes.
2 THE REGIME SYSTEM
Consideration will first turn, however, to an explication of the regimes and their
role and essential attributes as well as some characteristics of the modern security
environment in which they exist. The multilateral export control regime system is
currently comprised of four separate and almost wholly independent functional
supplier state regimes, the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG) in the nuclear weapons
and materials context, the Wassenaar Arrangement in the conventional weapons
context, the Australia Group concerned with chemical and biological weapons pro-
liferation, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in the missile and
related delivery system technologies area.3 Several of these export control and non-
proliferation regimes supplement the provisions of binding, multilateral treaties
primarily focused on the development and possession of weapons technologies,
including the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC).
4
3 See D. Gualtieri, 'The System of Non-Proliferation Export Controls' in D. Shelton (ed.),
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal
System (2000); R. Forsberg, et al., Nonproliferation Primer: Preventing the Spread of
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons (1995); B. Kellman, 'Bridling the
International Trade of Catastrophic Weaponry' (1994) 43 Am. U. L. Rev. 755; P. van
Ham, Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics, and Policies
(1993); T. Bernauer, The Chemistry of Regime Formation: Explaining International
Cooperation for a Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons (1993); M. Lipson, 'The
Reincarnation of COCOM: Explaining Post-Cold War Export Controls' (1999) The
NonProliferation Review; G. K. Bertsch and S. Grillot, Arms on the Market: Reducing the
Risk of Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union (1998); R. Cupitt and S. Grillot,
'COCOM is Dead, Long Live COCOM: Persistence and Change in Multilateral Security
Institutions' (1997) 27 British Journal of Political Science 361; E. H. Noehrenberg,
Multilateral Export Controls and International Regime Theory: the Effectiveness of
COCOM (1995).
4 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 1 July 1968,
21 UST 483, TIAS No. 6839, 729 UNTS 161; Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
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While differences exist among the particulars of the respective regimes, their
essential attributes share a great deal of similarity. All are informal political
arrangements, with no elements of legal formality in the commitments of member
states either in the originating regime documents or with regard to subsequent
guidelines and decisions made by or within the regimes. The regimes may perhaps
best be described using the framework for characterization of security communi-
ties, as a subset of international institutions, laid out by Emanuel Adler and Michael
Barnett. 5 This framework identifies security communities as arrangements between
states wherein members share identities, values and meanings concerning issues
related to their survival, and have an expectation of peaceful co-operation among
themselves. These communities are typified by interaction among members exhibit-
ing an appreciation of both short term and long term communal interests in co-
operating on issues of security concern. Security communities may be either loosely
or tightly joined together as gauged by the degree of interaction and structural for-
mality of the arrangement.
6
Adler and Barnett classify security communities in their movement from loose
to tight interaction and commonality of perspective using a categorical nomencla-
ture of nascent, ascendant and mature communities. The multilateral export control
regimes have varied in their placement within this categorization scheme both
among themselves and also collectively over the course of their evolutionary track,
at times arguably regressing within this hierarchy of developmental status.
However, in general they may be described as bordering between nascent and
ascendant communities, typified by their character as thoroughly informal, volun-
tary and vague associations of states who maintain discretion in implementing
regime policies, but which at the same time have become influential in the pro-
mulgation of norms and in possessing some elements of institutionalization, includ-
ing in some cases the appointment of permanent secretariats with staff and a
standing physical presence.
Their primary purpose being to co-ordinate and harmonize national policies
regarding non-proliferation export controls, the core membership of the regimes
has traditionally been those states already in possession of significant amounts of
such technologies, and therefore a proliferation threat (that is supplier states). In
addition to facilitating co-ordination and co-operation, the regimes have also
4 (continued) Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature 10 Apr. 1972, 26 UST
583, TIAS No. 8062, 1015 UNTS 163; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
opened for signature, Paris, 13 January 1993, entered into force 29 April 1997, 32 ILM
800.
5 For an excellent review of international relations theories on institutions in the context of
multilateral export control regimes, see M. Lipson, 'The Reincarnation of COCOM:
Explaining Post Cold-War Export Controls' (1999) 6(2) The Nonproliferation Review.
Regimes are defined by Stephen Krasner as the 'principles, norms, rules and decision-
making structures' that influence the behavior of states in various issue areas. See S.D.
Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables'
in Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (1983) 2.
6 E. Adler and M. Barnett (eds.), Security Communities (1998).
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become important promulgators of multilateral norms used in efforts by the
regimes and by international civil society of compliance pressuring, directed both
at regime members and non-members.7
The central features of each regime include a control list, composed of items
both of a single use (that is of only military practical usefulness) and of a dual use
character (that is with both legitimate civilian as well as WMD or high end con-
ventional weapons-related potential application) which are to be monitored with
utmost diligence by member states within their national regulatory systems, and
which should be a part of each member state's export licensing programme. These
lists are regularly updated as their covered technologies develop. The regimes
operate without exception on the principle of member consensus. Such consensus
is needed either to change originating documents, amend control lists or promul-
gate additional guidelines, or hortatory normative statements establishing minimal
standards for member state behaviour in the context of export controls. These
guidelines are uniformally vague and lacking in precision and are, of course, subject
to national discretion in their implementation in state law and policies.
In most of the regimes, there are procedures for information sharing among
member states particularly relating to license denials. When a denial of an export
license for an item on a control list is made at the national level, member states
under this rule are to notify the regime. This is a crucial element in ensuring
member states that the restrictive policies of the regime will not be abrogated to
the financial gain of one or a few members, to the corresponding loss of the remain-
der of member states whose positions have thereby been undercut and to the
mooting of regime principles.
8
Three out of the four regimes can trace their origins to the Cold War period,
and were initially formed by relatively small groups of 'like minded' states the chief
goal of many of which was to counter the influence of the Soviet Union and protect
the security interests of the West through harmonized control of WMD-related
materials and technology transfer.9 However, particularly since the fall of the Soviet
Union the regimes have been faced with an identity crisis, and their character as
supply side regimes comprised of like minded states has been challenged through
the addition of new members, many of whom were former targets of regime
controls including Russia itself, and many of which are either questionable in their
categorization as supplier states, have widely divergent perceptions of threat
7 See G.K. Bertsch and W.C. Potter (eds.), Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States (1999);
G.K. Bertsch, et al. (eds.), International Cooperation on Nonproliferation Export Controls
(1994); F.V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, & Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (1989); J. Goldstein and
R.O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Practical Change
(1993); J. Dhanapala, 'Multilateralism and the Future of the Global Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime' (2001) The Nonproliferation Review.
8 The Wassenaar Arrangement is the only one of the regimes without these denial
notification/no undercut policies.
9 See G.K. Bertsch, R.T. Cupitt and S. Elliot-Gower, 'Multilateral Export Control
Organizations' in Bertsch, Cupitt and Elliot-Gower (eds.), op. cit.
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identification and security interests, or which are substantively lacking in resources
to devote to export control efforts. 10
The regimes have in recent years been faced with other challenges flowing from
global politico-economic macro phenomena." These include the expansion in
number of states possessing sufficient quantities of dual use technologies to qualify
as significant supplier states. This expansion, coupled with general trends of
increased trade and the interlinking processes of globalization of business trans-
actions and interests particularly in defense industries, has contributed to the threat
of proliferation and the resulting complexity of regulating trade in WMD-related
technologies at the multilateral level.' 2 Complicating matters further is the fact that
some of these new supplier states have elected to remain outside of the existing
regimes.
3
In addition, public control of trade in dual use items has been rendered more
difficult through the phenomenon of privatization of dual use goods production. In
the Cold War years, development of dual use goods and weapons related tech-
nology was largely conducted by government-funded research, and thus was rela-
tively easy to keep track of and regulate. More recently, however, production of
dual use technologies has shifted in large degree to elements of the private sector,
as national governments have found that higher quality and lower prices are avail-
able 'off the shelf' in private markets. This shift has had the result of significantly
decentralizing the production of sensitive items and requiring increased co-
ordination between the private and public spheres and the institutionalization of
corporate compliance measures in the private sector, a programme which has met
with mixed results internationally.
14
10 See S. Gahlaut and V. Zaborsky, Do Regimes Have the Members They Need? (February
2003); R.T. Cupitt and I. Khripunov, 'New Strategies for the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG)' (1997) 16 Comparative Strategy 305; G.K. Bertsch and S. Grillot (eds.), Arms on
the Market: Reducing the Threat of Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union (1998) 235 36;
J. Baker, Nonproliferation Incentives for Russia and Ukraine (1997) 84-90; H. Muller,
'Nuclear Export Controls in Europe: An Introduction' in Muller (ed.), Nuclear Controls in
Europe (1995) 7-8. On problems stemming from increased numbers see R. Axelrod and
R. Keohane, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions' (1985)
38 World Politics 237. On dealing with larger numbers see M. Kahler, 'Multilateralism with
Small and Large Numbers' (1992) 46 International Organization 681.
11 See Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Export Controls, Warsaw,
Poland, September 30-October 4, 2002.
12 See W.A. Reinsch, 'Export Controls in the Age of Globalization' (1999) The Monitor:
Nonproliferation Demilitarization and Arms Control 5; Defense Industry Consolidation:
Competitive Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions (Testimony, 4 March 1998 GAO/T-
NSIAD-98-112); W.W. Keller and J.E. Nolan, 'The Arms Trade: Business as Usual?' (1997)
109 Foreign Policy 113.
13 Israel, India, Pakistan and China - all either declared or suspected nuclear weapons
possessing states, and a number of which are suspected of involvement in secondary
proliferation activities (i.e. proliferation from sources outside of the regimes) - are for
example not members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
14 On patterns of technology dissemination and the challenges presented thereby, see M.
Moodie, 'The Challenges of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons Enabling
Technology' in P. Gasprani Alves and K. Hoffman (eds.), The Transfer of Sensitive
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Also with the end of the Cold War, proliferation of WMD-related materials and
technology has until recently taken a back seat in the minds of many policymakers,
as the newly arrived unipolar movement and resultant 'new world order' has
seemed to justify turning attentions elsewhere. As a result, there has been a lack of
high-level political attention given to the multilateral export control regimes in the
past thirteen years. Part of this problem no doubt stems from the complexity of the
issue-area generally and the disparate nature of the regimes, with four separate
(and not always functionally named) groups with independent mandates and lists
of covered materials. The true possessors of expertise and keepers of institutional
wisdom and concern relative to the regimes are to be found at mid-level official
posts. This fact, while not harmful to the daily functioning of the regimes, has
resulted in some stagnation in regime policies, as the natural difficulty of consen-
sus building among nations to make desired changes is supplemented by the fact
that those most 'in the know' regarding needed alterations do not have the
authority to bring them about.
1 5
Finally, Iraqi post-1991 WMD revelations along with fears concerning WMD
development programmes notably in North Korea and Iran, combined with the
terror attacks of 11 September 2001, have thrust into the public spotlight the nexus
of WMD proliferation and global terrorism as the most serious challenge facing the
international community in the 21st century, and have highlighted the degree to
which sophisticated states and non-state actors have acquired or are threatening to
acquire WMD. In the wake of this modified calculus of geopolitical threat, the
multilateral export control regimes have in recent years, and particularly in the
wake of September 11, been the target of criticism by some both within national
governments and without who claim that the regimes have been insufficiently
adapted to the challenges posed by these and other forces of both external and
internal character. 16 Some commentators have claimed that the regimes have been
ineffective in accomplishing the goal of stopping the proliferation of their subject
materials and technology, and have insufficiently addressed the nexus of threat of
terrorism and WMD proliferation in their policies. Some have even questioned the
regimes' relevance and value to the international community's non-proliferation
efforts going forward.
17
This article will proceed to consider the concerns raised by these commentators
14 (continued) Technologies and the Future of Control Regimes (1997) 44-47. See also W.W.
Keller and J.E. Nolan, 'Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Threat to Stability'
(1997-1998) Foreign Policy 94; M. Hirsch, 'The Great Technology Giveaway', (September/
October 1998) Foreign Affairs 70-71.
15 See a full discussion of the current weaknesses of the multilateral export control regimes
and proposals for restructuring in Strengthening Multilateral Export Controls: A
Nonproliferation Priority (September 2002). See also the General Accounting Office's
2002 report entitled Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes.
16 See J. Cirincione (ed.), Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (2000); M. Barletta and A. Sands (eds.), Nonproliferation Regimes at Risk
(1999).
17 See A. Latham and B. Bow, 'Multilateral Export Control Regimes: Bridging the North-
South Divide' (1998) 3 Canadian Institute of International Affairs International Journal 53.
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relative to the effectiveness and legitimate role of the multilateral export control
regimes in the international community's 2 1st century non-proliferation programme,
and will posit that the regime system is in fact currently at a defining moment due
to the clash of increased expectations for regime performance with inherent struc-
tural limitations of the regimes themselves. It will consider both policy and process
level issues relating to this moment, and will propose significant efforts of restruc-
turing of the regimes to remedy these inherent structural problems and to meet
modem challenges to their effectiveness in filling their core non-proliferation roles.
2.1 Regime Effectiveness
From the start it must be noted that analysis of regime effectiveness, as customar-
ily cast in terms of member compliance with commitments undertaken in the
context of the multilateral export control regimes, is an exercise in unsurety and
definitional difficulty. As will be explained in more detail below, the guidelines of
the regimes are extremely vague in outlining the parameters of member state com-
mitments. For example, when considering the transfer of Category II items, includ-
ing complete rocket systems (ballistic missiles systems, space launch vehicles and
sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicles (including cruise missile systems,
target drones, and reconnaissance drones) the MTCR Guidelines state only that:
Particular restraint will also be exercised in the consideration of transfers...
if the Government judges, on the basis of all available, persuasive infor-
mation, evaluated according to factors including those in paragraph 3, that
they are intended to be used for the delivery of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers.
Thus the determination of threat and status of the end user, along with the criteria
for judging intent, as well as the level of 'restraint' appropriate in each case, is left
wholly to national discretion based only upon a number of listed factors without
authoritative interpretation or objective standards and with no transparent process
for verification.
In any case of alleged noncompliance with regime commitments, therefore,
there is precious little in th6 way of objectively ascertainable standards by which to
determine such compliance, with the result that reliable or objectively legitimate
studies or reports on levels of member compliance with regime norms have been
impossible to produce. This fact has made efforts of reform of the regimes all the
more difficult, as there has been very little data to point to establishing a compli-
ance problem. This combined with the further reality that some influential nations
have a vested interest in maintaining lax or ambiguous multilateral export control
standards have made proposals for restructuring relatively easy for those officials
to dismiss as unnecessary.
The compliance problem in the regimes can therefore be best described not only
as one wherein existing rules are not being complied with, or implemented
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sufficiently in national legal systems, but also one in which what rules there are, are
incapable of authoritative interpretation and determination, due to the institutional
characteristics of the regimes (discussed further below), on which to base a determi-
nation of non-compliance. That being said, there is a general understanding among
observers of the regimes that a number of key regime members have acted in the
past and are continuing to act in significant disharmony with interpretations of their
commitments commonly held by a majority of regime members. Common targets
of such criticism have included Russia and in some cases France and the United
States with regard to their commitments in the context of regimes of which they
have been members.
Of course casting the concept of regime effectiveness in terms of member com-
pliance with existing commitments is in fact only half of the picture. The other half
is the substance of the norms themselves. One hundred per cent member state com-
pliance with norms insufficiently constructed to address proliferation problems
would still not produce a regime system effective in achieving its goals in this regard.
In reality therefore the ineffectiveness of the multilateral export control regimes is
necessarily viewed as a two-fold problem, consisting both of levels of compliance
with existing norms, and with the insufficient character of the norms themselves.
However, both aspects of this larger issue of regime effectiveness can be viewed as
being framed within the context of the gap between heightened expectations for
regime effectiveness, to be found in statements of policymakers and others, and
institutional facets of the current structure of the regimes themselves.
2.2 Structural Problems
Critics have identified a number of problems with the institutional structure of the
regimes as currently constituted which are claimed to be at the root of problems of
regime ineffectiveness. It is proposed herein that it would in fact be more accurate
to describe these structural elements as limitations rather than problems in the most
fundamental sense. For as the insider government officials who constitute the func-
tioning members of the regimes are quick to point out, the regimes were never
designed to fulfill the expectations which have been placed upon them of late.
Indeed, as previously noted the origin of the multilateral export control regimes is
to be found in small groups of supplier states (of generally uniform identity
throughout the regimes) relatively speaking of a 'like mind' concerning perceptions
of threat (that is states to be the target of regime controls) and their security inter-
ests in general.
The primary function of the regimes during their formative stages was to aid in
the harmonization of national export control policies and to provide fora for co-
operation, information sharing, and the promulgation of norms to govern trade in
sensitive items and technologies. The regimes were not originally mandated to take
on separate lives as organizations, charged with taking independent measures in the
struggle against proliferation, and were certainly not chartered as institutions
focused upon the very nebulous and at that time immature phenomenon of
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international terrorism. In fact, most officials maintain that the regimes have per-
formed relatively well given their modest mandates and have been effective in
accomplishing their goals of facilitating co-operation among member states relative
to their national non-proliferation efforts.'
8
However, there is a simple tautological truth in the statement that voluntary,
normatively vague organizational and rulemaking structures are efficient in accom-
plishing their aims only when those aims are of a character which can be satisfied
by levels of uniformity in member-state compliance consistent with voluntary,
vague and thereby unenforceable rules. This almost insultingly simple maxim-like
statement has however profound implications for the multilateral export control
regime system. As will be more fully discussed below, if the current regime system
is to be instrumental in effecting increased levels of harmonization among national
export control policies and compliance with a multilaterally conceived set of norma-
tive bases for the deterrence of WMD proliferation, as is desired by many in the
security community, it will by necessity need to be endowed with an institutional
structure capable of the clarity, independent interpretive discretion, and precision
necessary to bring about such results.
19
2.3 Informality
Among the limitations in existing elements of regime structure which have been
identified, the most problematic and influential is the informal nature of the regimes
as institutions.20 As previously noted, each of the regimes was established by its
members with no legally binding character attaching either to originating docu-
ments (which as a rule were adopted only by joint declaration and without signa-
tures) or to subsequent guidelines or decisions of the regimes, including those
relating to the harmonisation of members' national licensing systems with regime
control lists. For this reason, many have quite accurately likened the current struc-
ture of the multilateral export control regime system to a collection of 'supplier
states clubs', bereft of normative or legal foundation or compulsory procedures to
produce compliance with regime rules. 21 In addition to this weakness in the 'letter'
of regime documentary foundations is the further fact that the regimes as previ-
ously noted have been endowed with uniformly vague substantive rules, an aspect
18 See Strengthening Multilateral Export Controls: A Nonproliferation Priority (September
2002).
19 See M. Beck and S. Gahlaut, 'Creating a New Multilateral Export Control Regime' (April
2003) Arms Control Today 8-9.
20 See M. Beck, 'Reforming the Multilateral Export Control Regimes' (2000) The
NonProliferation Review 91.
21 See the Congressional Research Service study, Treaties and other International
Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, 10 3 rd Congress, 1 1
t Session (November
1993) ('Non-binding agreements may take many forms, including... declarations of intent,
joint communiques and joint statements (including final acts of conferences) and informal
agreements').
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of their structures which has traditionally bedeviled efforts of promoting compli-
ance even with the 'spirit' of the regimes.22
A further particularly poignant example of this vagueness in substantive regime
rules is the lack of consensus in any of the regimes regarding end users of concern.
The technological annexes to the regimes are as a general rule highly detailed in
their specification of items subject to regime regulation. Thus, when contemplating
an export, a regime member may be reasonably assured of the sensitivity level of
items in question. However, due to the lack of consensus on bad end users, there is
very little either in the guidelines or annexes of the regimes to guide a member state
as to proper and improper destinations for the items. This absence of a collective
determination of threat and end users of concern has had a significant undermin-
ing effect upon efforts to promote compliance with a multilaterally conceived set
of normative prescriptions, and has left states to their own devices in making deter-
minations of threat with no procedure for resolution of these issues having been
achieved in the documentary foundations of the regimes.
International law has classically recognised two sources of binding norm gener-
ation in relations among states. The first is treaties, which are written agreements
between two or more parties, the obligations of which apply solely to those
executing the treaty. Treaties are binding upon their signatories and subject to
adjudication in international judicial fora. The second is customary international
law, which develops through the acts of states accompanied with sufficient opinio
juris, or expressed sense of legal obligation, of state officials. 23 Custom may form
parallel to or wholly independent from treaties and may bind not only those who
participate in its creation, but potentially also other states who do not successfully
obtain persistent objector status while the customary norm is in creation. 24 While
not without theoretical and practical weaknesses as a true system of law, these two
22 M. Beck, 'Reforming the Multilateral Export Control Regimes' (2000) The
NonProliferation Review 17-18 ('A regime is effective to the extent that its members
comply or abide by regime provisions. However, in the case of the export control regimes,
the regime guidelines are often so vague that disputes can arise over what exports are
contrary to regime provisions. For example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines set
forth a "nonproliferation principle" whereby supplier states are called upon to only
authorize exports of sensitive nuclear items when they are "satisfied that the transfers
would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons" ... Moreover, the provision
calls upon member states themselves to make risk assessments about the likelihood that an
export will be diverted to unauthorized military uses').
23 See UN Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 (listing the sources of
international law). See also G. Bunn, 'The Status of Norms Against Nuclear Testing' (1999)
The NonProliferation Review 30-46 for an excellent review of the sources of international
norms, including what Bunn refers to as 'politically binding' as opposed to 'legally binding'
soft international norms. I have chosen in this article to adopt the usage of 'soft law'
common in international legal literature, though Bunn's usage and its implications are
entirely accurate.
24 See A.H. Chayes and A. Chayes, 'Regime Architecture: Elements and Principles' in J.E.
Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (1994) 54;
P. Szasz, 'General Law-Making Processes' in 0. Schachter and C. Joyner (eds.), United
Nations Legal Order 152.
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sources have traditionally been held to produce binding obligations, or 'hard' inter-
national law.
Such structures as the multilateral export control regimes by contrast are
representative of a modem movement in international law and organization to give
some credence to the normative utility of instruments and understandings between
state parties that are not strictly speaking legally binding, but which are entered into
with an expectation that they will influence the behaviour of their declarants.
25
Speaking of the proponents of this 'soft law' movement, one commentator has
written:
they stress that these instruments fulfill at least some, if not a great number,
of the criteria required for rules to be considered rules of international law
and cannot therefore be simply put aside as non-law. In other words, they
acknowledge that there exists a considerable 'grey area' of 'soft-law'
between the white space of law and the black territory of non-law. Simul-
taneously, they make the salient point that the 'grey area' may greatly affect
the white one and explain, sometimes in considerable detail, in what ways
'soft law' can have legal effects.2 6
25 See D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (1998) 64-65. As Oscar Schachter,
a preeminent international law scholar, has noted: 'States entering into a non-legal
commitment generally view it as a political (or moral) obligation and intend to carry it out
in good faith. Other parties and other states concerned have reasons to expect such
compliance and to rely on it ... [P]olitical texts which express commitments and positions
of one kind or another are governed by the general principle of good faith'. 0. Schachter,
International Law in Theory and Practice (1982) 178. See also 0. Schachter, 'The Twilight
Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements' (1977) 71 American Journal of
International Law 296. While such soft law instruments are not submitted to the advice and
consent and ratification procedures required for treaties under United States law, when
questioned about them by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger once remarked that the United States is not 'morally or politically free to
act as if they did not exist. On the contrary, they are important statements of diplomatic
policy and engage the good faith of the United States as long as the circumstances that gave
rise to them continue'. 73 US Department of State Bulletin (1975) 613, quoted in the
Congressional Research Service study Treaties and other International Agreements: The
Role of the United States Senate, 103rd Congress, 1st Session (November 1993) 38.
26 Van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources ofInternational Law (1983) 187. The distinction between
hard and soft law and the recognition of soft law instruments has met with disapproval by
some in the international legal community, however. As expressed by Jerzy Sztucki:
'Primo. the term is inadequate and misleading. There are no two levels or "species" of law
- something is law or is not law. Secundo, the concept is counterproductive or even
dangerous. On the one hand, it creates illusory expectations of (perhaps even insistence
on) compliance with what no one is obliged to comply; and on the other hand, it exposes
binding legal norms for risks of neglect, and international law as a whole for risks of
erosion, by blurring the threshold between what is legally binding and what is not'. Festkrift
Hjerner 550-551 (1990). However, as D.J. Harris, op. cit., 65 has responded: 'While it may
be paradoxical and confusing to call something "law" when it is not law, the concept is
nonetheless useful to describe instruments that clearly have an impact on international
relations and that may later harden into custom or become the basis of a treaty'. See also
G. Bunn, 'The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon
States' (1997) The NonProliferation Review 24.
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There are of course sound reasons why the framers of the various multilateral
export control regimes chose to institutionalize the international regulation of the
area of non-proliferation export controls using softer, as opposed to harder, forms
of institutional structure and procedures. As noted in one of the leading treatments
of the relative advantages of soft versus hard law structure in international organiz-
ations, hard law is best utilised to regulate areas of international interaction in
which the value placed on making credible commitments is high, reduction of long-
term transaction costs from continual re-negotiation is important, political
strategies may be supplemented by adjudicative or otherwise legalistic inter-
national regimes, and where delegation of authority to international fora is an
attractive means for remedying inherent problems of incomplete contracting.
27
It concludes that soft law, by contrast, is most attractive in issue areas in which
a premium is placed on low initial contracting costs, where the use of hard law
would present unacceptable sovereignty costs (which are highest when proposed
international legalisation touches upon important issues of national security), and
where the novelty and complexity of the issue area create a high degree of uncer-
tainty and possibility for positional change which make hard law enshrinement of
norms unattractive. It also recognises soft law as being an efficient means of com-
promise between antagonistic positions between states, particularly in the early
stages of normative consideration of a subject area.
28
The area of nonproliferation export controls, particularly in the sub-categories
of WMD related and dual use items, is an issue area intimately tied to perceptions
of national security interest and fundamental national sovereignty concern. It
additionally has from its inception constituted an attempt to regulate a variety of
dynamic and often overlapping technologies and their transfer to end users the
threat status of which is a source of considerable contention among regime
members. Thus, it is an area convincingly argued to be best regulated, at least in
the preliminary stages of regime formation, by softer, more co-operative organiz-
ational understandings as opposed to harder, more compulsory ones.
29
Again, however, for the heightened expectations of observers of the regimes to
be met, that is for the regimes to be both more effective in the promulgation of
adequate norms addressing problems of WMD proliferation and in facilitating
member implementation of those norms in their national systems, it is this article's
contention that attention will need to be paid to proposals for increasing the
27 K. Abbot and D. Snidal, 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance' (2000) 54
International Organization 421.
28 Ibid.
29 See A. Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World' in D.A.
Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (1993) 57-59; J.
Grieco, 'Understanding the Problem of Institutional Cooperation' in Baldwin, op. cit., 84;
L.L. Martin, Coersive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (1993)
159-65; R.T. Cupitt and W.J. Long, 'Multilateral Cooperation and Nuclear
Nonproliferation' in Z.S. Davis and B. Frankel (eds.), The Proliferation Puzzle: Why
Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (1993) 40; G. Bunn and D. Holloway, Arms
Control Without Treaties? (February 1998).
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formality of the structure of the regimes. However, as a fuller discussion of this
point below will establish, this formalisation need not be effected by an increase in
the binding nature of commitments relative to the regimes. Rather, employing
modern trends in both international legal theory and international relations theory
it will be argued that increases in specificity of those commitments, combined with
the institution of an adjudicatory forum within the structure of the regimes to which
will be delegated interpretive authority, can together constitute the necessary
elements of formalisation for increasing member compliance and regime effective-
ness.
2.4 Consensus Rules
In addition to informality, another limitation in the structural makeup of the
regimes which has been pointed to by critics is the practice in all the regimes of
acting only upon the basis of consensus.30 The consensus rule applies across the
board to changes in originating documents, changes to guidelines, membership
decisions, as well as alterations to control lists. This consensus principle, while
understandable considering the sovereignty and security relevance of the issue area
of WMD non-proliferation export controls, has formed a significant hinderance to
the effectiveness of the regimes in promulgating progressive norms and in facili-
tating harmonisation of members' national export control systems. It has, accord-
ing to experts, made the regimes slow to respond to technological changes,
including intelligence on new military applications of existing technologies, new
means of acquisition of illicit materials and technology by states of concern, and
other emerging threats to international security.
Consensus rules have become a particularly difficult problem due to the more
recent phenomenon of expansion of regime membership, and the inclusion of states
with highly varied perceptions of threat and concern regarding trade in sensitive
technologies. Due to the maintenance of consensus voting rules, regime action can
be, and in fact has often been, held up by one dissenting member. This fact is even
more troubling to members forming a majority view on such points as it is under-
stood that any change in regime voting rules, or in the membership status of prob-
lematic members, is held hostage by the very same principle.
Consensus voting rules within the regimes are in fact the principal reason for
the conclusion that, in order for meaningful restructuring of the regimes to take
place, an entirely new institutional structure for the regimes will need to be created.
Simply put, with the consensus voting rules in place no significant restructuring to
meet modem challenges and heightened expectations, and to remedy structural
limitations of informality and the very existence of such rules, will take place
because at every turn in this process there will inevitably be aggrieved and dis-
senting regime members. Changes in structure to allow for greater formality and
30 See M. Beck and S. Gahlaut, 'Creating a New Multilateral Export Control Regime', Arms
Control Today (April 2003).
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lesser unilateral control over regime decisionmaking will by their very nature and
purpose affect a loss in autonomy of members to act according to their national dis-
cretion. In the security realm as in others, but poignantly so in this context, such
concessions of national sovereignty are not made lightly by states and perspectives
on details of the new regime order are likely to vary substantially among members.
Thus it will fall to those states desirous of pushing forward the non-proliferation
efforts of the international community to new levels of effectiveness to institute a
bold new programme of reform and creation of a new regime sui generis, which
while sharing many characteristics and attributes of the existing regimes will be a
new and independent merged entity.31
This referenced division of perspectives will of course yet be the case even in
the context of the creation of an entirely new institutional structure. The advan-
tages of such a new programme of establishment, however, include the fact that
the states who will again be at the nucleus of this revised effort are likely to be
relatively like minded and therefore able to compromise and produce results due
both to their like minded and co-operative relationship as well as the fact that in
this effort compromise is crucial, as no higher powers (such as veto powers) will
have yet been granted to negotiating participants. To this new institution formed
ideally by a small number of the most influential supplier states will undoubtedly
be drawn the other supplier states, including emerging supplier states, whose
membership will not only be a sign of maturity and inclusion in the international
community, but whose prosperity can - as it has in the case of membership in the
existing regimes - be linked in very real ways to accession to the new compre-
hensive regime structure.
In the interests of contributing to debate within both legal and policy circles
relative to the potential design of such a merged and restructured multilateral
export control regime system, this article will proceed to consider concrete pro-
posals of institutional restructuring to aid in meeting the referenced modem chal-
lenges of politico-economic reality and increased expectations of the security
community, and to remedy the identified structural limitations of the existing
regimes.
31 The idea of merging the multilateral export control regimes is not new. It was
recommended a decade ago in a study by the National Academy of Sciences, Finding
Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment (1991) 131. See
also P. Freedenberg and I. Khripunov, 'Arms Control is Global Mission', Defense News
(27 January 1992); L.S. Spector and V. Foran, Preventing Weapons Proliferation: Should
the Regimes be Combined? Report of the Thirty-Third Strategy for Peace, US Foreign
Policy Conference, The Stanley Foundation, 22-24 October 1992; T.W. Galdi, Proliferation
Export Control Regimes: Options for Coordination or Consolidation (1993). On the
importance of state policies strengthening the multilateral regimes see H. Muller,
'Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty
Enforcement' (2000) The NonProliferation Review 87 and 0. Young, 'Political Leadership
and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society'
(1991) 45 International Organization 281.
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2.5 New Regime Foundations
The advantages of a new restructured and merged regime system in the multi-
lateral export control context include at the most basic level those efficiencies
which naturally flow from centralisation. Not least among these advantages is
simple avoidance of redundancy and duplication of effort. Notwithstanding their
different subject areas of control and the separate identities and developed
cultural characteristics, as well as attached policy and technical experts communi-
ties of the four existing regimes, they yet boast nearly identical membership rolls.
And while bureaucratic turf wars may ensue within national governments if
member states are limited to one delegation to the regime system instead of four,
it remains the case that issues and strategies to deal with the complex controls and
end user issues present in all four current regimes are very similar if not identical
and may therefore most logically and efficiently be addressed in one unified struc-
tural framework.
Second, the co-location in a single institutional context of all regimes focused
on multilateral WMD non-proliferation export controls would facilitate inter-
regime dialogue on issues of cross-cutting concern, including trans-shipment,
transfers of intangible technologies, information sharing and end users of
concern. Third, centralisation of regime activities into one overarching forum
would save scarce resources and cut down on what have become excessive prac-
tices of 'diplomatic tourism', in which the international working groups of official
experts have been known to spend vast percentages of their calendars in travel-
ling to the far flung meetings of each respective regime only to interact with the
very same cast of diplomatic characters, simply wearing different regime delega-
tion name tags.
Finally, a centralized multilateral export control regime system would coun-
teract the previously identified problems of issue area complexity and confusingly
dispersed and independent regime frameworks which have hindered the attrac-
tion of higher-level political attention to regime issues. These even more
calendar-challenged and attention sparse higher ups would be significantly more
likely to attend one comprehensive plenary meeting covering all subjects of
export control concern, held in one locale, than they would to attend four annual
plenaries, one for each sub-regime. Their participation and realisation of the
importance of and need for multilateral co-ordination of export control efforts
would have an incalculable effect upon the future direction and success of such
efforts, particularly in their ability to negotiate substantive changes to the regimes
as needed to allow them to better adapt to the constantly changing international
security environment. 32 In addition to these simple advantages of co-location,
however, could be added more substantive structural modifications to the existing
regime system.
32 See M. Beck and S. Gahlaut, 'Creating a New Multilateral Export Control Regime', Arms
Control Today (April 2003).
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2.6 Formalisation
First on the topic of informality. There is a substantial body of literature linking
formalisation in the institutional structure of international regimes, and particularly
in the substance of obligations undertaken by regime members, to increased
member-state compliance with regime rules. There are in fact at least two treat-
ments that argue for such binding formalisation in the specific context of the multi-
lateral export control regime system.33 According to this literature, formalisation
of commitments and institutionalisation of commitments in regime structures is
facilitative of state compliance because of its functions in clearly delineating legiti-
mate and illegitimate state behaviour, reducing transactions costs, establishing clear
standards for state behaviour, establishing linkages between issues and between
regimes, improving confidence in information sharing, reducing motivations to
cheat, enhancing the value of reputation, and making decentralised enforcement
possible by creating processes of institutional monitoring.
34
There is also, however, a considerable and growing body of literature disputing
the claim that an increase in the binding nature of commitments at the documen-
tary foundation of international regimes inescapably leads to increased levels of
member compliance. Rather, say proponents of this opposing view, formalisation
in the structure of international institutions can be separated into at least three
broad sub-categories - obligation, precision, and delegation - the sum of the
relative presence of each being the functional determinant of the degree of for-
malisation, or legalisation, present in the regime. As described by Keohane et al.:
'Legalization' refers to a particular set of characteristics that institutions may
(or may not) possess. These characteristics are defined along three dimen-
sions: obligation, precision, and delegation. Obligation means that states or
other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of rules or com-
mitments. Specifically, it means that they are legally bound by a rule or com-
mitment in the sense that their behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny
under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of international law, and
often of domestic law as well. Precision means that rules unambiguously
define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation means
that third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and
apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules.
35
33 See D. Gualtieri, 'The System of Non-Proliferation Export Controls' in D. Shelton (ed.),
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal
System (2000) 123; B. Kellman, 'Bridling the International Trade of Catastrophic
Weaponry' (1994) 43 AUL REV. 755. See also G. Bunn, Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials: Strengthening Global Norms, IAEA doc., November 1997.
34 See ibid; A. Chayes and A. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International
Regulatory Agreements (1995); R. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in
the World Political Economy (1984); A.S. Burley, 'International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda' (1993) 87 AJIL 205; R. Jervis, 'Security Regimes' in S.
Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (1983) 47.
35 K. Abbot et al., 'The Concept of Legalization' (2000) 54 International Organization 401.
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In some cases, it is argued, greater legalisation of commitments, as through the con-
clusion of binding treaties, is not advantageous, particularly as those obligations
cover areas of state interaction in which sovereignty costs and uncertainty are
high.36 The clear relevance of WMD export controls to concerns of national security
and the intimacy of security to perceptions of national sovereignty, along with the
previously mentioned technologically dynamic aspects of export control regimes,
serve to perfectly qualify the multilateral export control regime system as a candi-
date for informal obligation in the documentary structure of the regime.
However, it is also important to note that formalisation in the structural attrib-
utes of international regimes, and its attendant positive impact upon compliance
by member states, can be effected in the absence of legalised obligations by
increases in either the precision of regime rules or by processes of delegation of
some rulemaking or interpretive authority to regime structures or by a combi-
nation of these elements. Examples of regimes in which formalisation has been
achieved through a combination of precision and delegation include the UN Com-
mittee on Sustainable Development (Agenda 21) with its accompanying non-
binding normative instruments, including the Forest Principles adopted at the 1992
Rio Conference on Environment and Development (high precision and moderate
delegation), the CSCE/OSCE's 1975 Helsinki Final Act (high precision and low
delegation), and the UN Human Rights Commission (low precision, high delega-
tion).37
2.7 Compliance
A note on compliance. In formulating theories of state compliance with inter-
national law prescriptions, it is easy and perhaps too common to project our
assumptions flowing from individual and collective experience living under the
vertical enforcement mechanisms of national legal systems onto the international
legal system writ large. As most such exercises are, however, this fallacy of com-
position is based upon a fundamentally misinformed conception of the contours
and substantive attributes of the international legal system, and therefore leads to
false expectations for the behaviour of its processes and creations. Compliance with
the dictates of international law, or the rules of international organizations, is in
fact effected through a much more complex, much looser horizontal system of
both domestic and international pressure by citizens and by other states and
36 Ibid.; K. Abbot and D. Snidal, 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance' (2000) 54
International Organization 421; J. Trachtman, 'Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance'
(1999)10 EJIL 655; G.W. Downs et al., 'Is the Good News About Compliance Good News
About Cooperation?' (1996) 50 International Organization 75; J. Goldstein and L. Martin,
'Legalization, Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note' (2000) 54
International Organization 603.
37 See Kenneth Abbot et al., 'The Concept of Legalization' (2000) 54 International
Organization 401 for this method of categorisation of regimes.
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non-governmental actors.38 Its primary guarantor of enforcement relies upon a
cost-benefit (or cost-value) analysis by the state-subjects of such rules, an analysis
which is fuelled and informed by the enmeshing results of globalisation, issue
linkages, norm internalisation and the increasing legalisation of many aspects of
international relations.
39
There are substantial grounds on which to posit, therefore, that at least in some
areas of international interaction, levels of state compliance with international
norms within regimes are not significantly increased through the legalisation of
underlying commitments. Rather, in areas in which softness of obligations is either
a theoretical utility or political necessity, attempts to increase the formalisation of
obligations of member states may in fact lead to an over-playing of the hand of the
organization and of the international legal system in general, likely resulting either
in a substantial increase in vagueness or generality in substantive rules and com-
mitments or, if the former does not occur, in a compliance deficit which the organiz-
ation does not have the institutional capacity to narrow. As Joel Trachtman has
explained:
hard law is not necessarily good law, and strengthened implementation,
including possible direct effect, is not necessarily desirable. This seems
obvious once we recognize that, putting aside for a moment transaction
costs and strategic costs, states generally have the level of compliance that
they want. The correct role for scholars and for lawyers involved with these
issues is to help political decision-makers to identify circumstances in
which, due to such problems, states have not achieved the desired level of
compliance.
40
Implicit in this assertion is that it is the weight of a norm as a recognized inter-
national community standard, with the corresponding moral, reputational, and
precedential factors militating for its observance, that in fact effects compliance and
not the precise status of the norm in the relative hierarchy of legality imposed by
the international legal system.41 Thus, in some cases it is highly preferable to have
38 Abram and Antonia Chayes, 'On Compliance' (1993) 47 International Organization
175; A.T. Guzman, 'A Compliance Based Theory of International Law' (2002) 90 Cal.
L Rev. 24; H.H. Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?' (1997) 106 Yale LJ2599.
39 See J. Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (1989); J.B. Braithwaite,
Crime, Shame and Reintegration (1989); A. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The
Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (1995); L.L. Martin, 'The Rational State Choice of
Multilateralism' (1992) 46 International Organization 76; J. Checkel, 'Why Comply?: Social
Learning and European Identity Change' (2001) 55 International Organization 3.
40 J. Trachtman, 'Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance' (1999) 10 EJIL 655.
41 This of course presupposes a degree of transparency in the workings of institutions such
that there is adequate information disclosure regarding norms around which pressure can
be brought to bear upon states in favour of its observance. See M. Finnemore, 'Norms,
Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism' (1996) 50
International Organization 325; T. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations
(1990).
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specific, soft commitments than to have more vague binding commitments as the
specificity of the norm is more likely to form a principled locus around which efforts
of domestic and international compliance pressure may be focused. 42
This observation that states are often no more likely to comply with a norm in
its legalised incarnation than in its embodiment in softer, non-binding instruments
is inspiring of optimism in the modern era in which increasing use is being made of
soft-law based regulatory or co-operative regimes in a variety of international issue
areas in order to overcome the difficulties of securing hard commitments particu-
larly in areas of state sovereignty sensitivity.
The immediate implications for the multilateral export control regimes include
the strong likelihood that an increase in specificity of regime rules and some form
of albeit primitive delegation for the purpose of interpretive uniformity can lead to
increased state compliance with a more cohesive set of regime rules even in the
absence of more binding documentary structures, which are unlikely to be con-
cluded by member states in this area in the near future. This proposal for reform-
ing the multilateral export control regime system into a merged institutional
structure still based on non-binding initial documents yet comprised of significantly
more formalised substantive provisions and procedures is based upon an under-
standing and appreciation of the particular nature of multilateral regulation in this
sovereignty-sensitive area. It is in the final analysis a far more politically palatable
option for policymakers to consider, and hopefully even embrace, than is the
position of some observers of the regimes, who in haste to recommend changes to
deal with the apparent weaknesses of the regimes adopt overly-elementary and
non-politically-viable structural models for such modification.
2.8 Non-Consensual Voting Procedures
Second, on the topic of consensus voting rules, a restructured multilateral export
control regime system could incorporate a diversified approach to institutional
decision-making, leaving in place consensus voting procedures for those issues of
first importance (that is deal breaking issues such as new member admissions) and
for elements of regime identity (for example amendments to originating docu-
ments), but substituting supermajority or weighted voting procedures for an array
42 See J. Checkel, 'Why Comply?: Social Learning and European Identity Change' (2001) 55
International Organization 3. This conclusion has some theoretical kinship to the
arguments of the managerial school of regime theory, in which compliance with regime
norms is asserted to be more likely achieved through persuasive and 'managerial'
approaches rather than by the use of coercive sanctions built into the structure of regimes.
See Abram and Antonia Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International
Regulatory Agreements (1995). It is also in keeping with the definition of international
regimes put forward by Stephen D. Krasner as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms,
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a
given area of international relations'. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables' in S. Krasner (ed.), International
Regimes (1983) 7-8.
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of decisions in such areas as modification of control lists, identification of member
violations, sanctioning and expulsion of members, passage of guidelines, and
identification of end users of concern.
This substitution of non-consensual voting procedures is a vital part of any
proposed restructuring effort and is becoming increasingly necessary particularly
due to the new membership issues discussed previously and the admission to the
regimes since the end of the Cold War of states with widely varying threat percep-
tions and value placed on export controls. It would enormously aid in the efficiency
of the regime and the ability of members to make needed changes and take action
deemed by a vast majority of members to be prudent without fear of being forever
hung by procedure through the dissenting votes of one or a few members.
While it is relatively easy to propose the institution of non-consensual voting
procedures for the new regime structure, this in fact is no modest proposition
inasmuch as it is likely to face strident opposition by many current regime members.
This again raises the question of status quo versus something different, and the
clashing of higher expectations with current structural regime limitations. Despite
this opposition, based in arguments of sovereign autonomy and the sensitivity and
security relevance of regime decisions, it is likely to be the case that if the origi-
nating nucleus of states-proponents of the restructured regime commit themselves
and their influence to the establishment of a merged and restructured entity includ-
ing the elements of formality and voting procedures discussed in this section, there
will be a domino effect of second-tier supplier states and others who will accept
membership in the new regime to preserve their place in the international security
community and to safeguard their prosperity in a globalising economy, in which to
be labelled a pariah by the most influential members of the international com-
munity, particularly in the area of WMID proliferation, is to unlock a Pandora's box
of danger and difficulties.
3 NEW REGIME DESIGN
Having reviewed some general structural amendments which could be incorporated
into a new multilateral export control regime system, this article will proceed to
offer a more detailed proposal of an institutional model for the new merged and
restructured regime. This in fact is an area in which this treatment hopes to make
a significant contribution to existing debates concerning the future of the multi-
lateral regimes, as to the author's knowledge no such detailed institutional pro-
posals have ever been offered. This section will bring principles of institutional
design and organizational structure to bear on the question of what institutional
model would best suit the renewed multilateral export control regime system.
In many ways, forming an international institution is an exercise similar to that
in which a private corporate lawyer engages when considering the structure of a
new corporation. There are of course a number of legitimate models to choose from
in the corporate design context, each coming with a particular set of advantages and
areas of strength which must be fit to the corresponding facts of the case to
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determine which model will produce the best and most desirable fit. When forming
an international institution, consideration must first be had of the particular needs
and characteristics of the issue area in question and the desires and needs of poten-
tial member states. Then and only then can a proper institutional framework be
divined by creative thinking and by reference to the vast array of designs already
in place to facilitate international interaction in various issue areas.
Taking into consideration the needs and desires of the multilateral export
control regime system and its concerned community, this article will advance the
thesis that an institutional arrangement most analogous to that currently applied
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) will best suit those needs and lead to
greatest efficiency and potential success for the restructuring effort. Before begin-
ning this exercise, however, it should be clear that this paper's contention is
simply that elements of the structural and procedural attributes of the WTO
system, and not necessarily the role or function of that system, could find useful
application in the multilateral export control regime context. In so disclaiming, it
is hoped that automatic cognitive reference to issues of current discussion and
perhaps concern peculiar to the latter characteristics of the WTO system will be
avoided.
That being said, however, the history of international regulation of general
trade since the mid-twentieth century, as considered by analogy from an insti-
tutional development perspective, is in fact also quite instructive to the current dis-
cussion concerning the multilateral export control regime system.43 Commercial
trade between nations has historically been among the most sensitive of areas to
regulate because of the potential far-reaching effect of such regulation upon per-
ceived domestic prerogatives and the importance of successful international trade
to national economies. After the Second World War, the largest economic powers
concluded on a relatively loose association to preliminarily cover the area of inter-
national trade, established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). While technically a binding international agreement, the GATT was in
actuality quite soft in a number of ways.
The GATT was subject to a number of institutional 'birth defects' having never
been intended or structured to compose a true organization in the international
legal sense and being adopted only provisionally after the failure of the Inter-
national Trade Organization in 1950. Partially due to its unintended rise to promi-
nence, the provisions of the GATT relative to rulemaking and adjudication were
fashioned quite broadly and vaguely, attributes of its structure which would come
back to haunt it time and again as lack of clarity and precision in its provisions led
to ad hoc and inconsistent application of its precepts, and very often simple neglect
43 For this section see J.H. Jackson, The World Trading System (2
nd edn, 1998) 106; G.P.
Sampson (ed.), The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance (2001);
T.H. Cohn, Governing Global Trade: International Institutions In Conflict And
Convergence (2002); T.W. Zeiler, Trade Free World: The Advent of GATT (1999);
J. Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round (1999);
K. Adamantopoulos (ed.), An Anatomy of the World Trade Organization (1997).
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of its use. Its adjudication procedures as well were often hamstrung in their
effectiveness due to the practice of requiring consensual adoption of panel rulings
in order to bestow finality upon them - including the consent of the state against
whom the adjudicatory panel had ruled.
These and other institutional imperfections, including the fact that the GATT
was entered into as an executive agreement by the United States and never sub-
jected to senate ratification, also led to great doubt and disagreement as to the
relevance of GATT rules and adjudicatory procedures to national law and policy.
In the United States in particular there was great debate in legal circles as to the
binding character of GATT obligations in national law. This ambiguity relative to
implementation of GATT policy further strained its institutional credibility and
thereby undercut its effectiveness in regulating the area of international trade.
44
The GATT however served to introduce some normativisation to the issue area,
and in doing so illustrated in a fairly non-threatening way to its signatories the
advantages of mutual co-operation in the area based on norms.
With the institution of the World Trade Organization in 1995, many of the in-
efficiencies proceeding from structural imperfection in the GATT were remedied.
The provisions of the World Trade Organization Agreement were decidedly more
clear and comprehensive, particularly in terms of the administrative structure of the
organization, than were the GATT provisions on these subjects. The Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding (DSU), attached as an annex to the agreement, set out a much
clearer and more formal adjudication process for disputes arising among members.
The DSU, for example, reversed the procedure for adoption of dispute panel
rulings making such reports presumptively binding absent its unanimous dis-
approval by all member states. Also included in the WTO Agreement was the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), an institutionalised procedure for pro-
moting transparency and for assessing the overall effectiveness of the regime
through a regular review of member states' trade policies.
The general institutional structure of the World Trade Organization is also quite
instructive. The WTO Agreement itself is a mere ten pages long.45 Its purpose is
simply to establish a framework of organizational elements and organs to provide
an administrative system for the institution. It therefore details the various bodies
through which the organization functions at the general level. These include a
Ministerial Conference, composed of all members, which meets approximately
once every two years and which has authority to take decisions under all of the sub-
agreements and to make substantive changes to all organizational documents. Also
included in the organizational structure is a General Council, also composed of
representatives of all members, which meets on a more regular and frequent basis,
44 See J.H. Jackson et al., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (3rd ed., 1995)
289-326.
45 As reprinted in the 1995 Documentary Supplement to J.H. Jackson, W.J. Davey and A.O.
Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (3rd ed., 1995). This is in
stark contrast to the 22,500 pages of tariff bindings which complete the Uruguay Round
Agreements establishing the WTO.
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and which conducts the functions of the Ministerial Conference when it is not in
session. The General Council additionally convenes as appropriate to discharge the
responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement body, and the Trade Policy Review body
- that is the same mid-level national officials which make up the General Council,
simply wearing different functional hats.
Attached to this framework administrative structure are a number of sub-
agreements which cover substantive areas of trade, including the revised General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS). These three agreements, termed multilateral agreements, are
currently binding upon all WTO members. In addition, however, there are two
plurilateral agreements, the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and the Agree-
ment on Government Procurement, which are only binding upon their signatories
and not incumbent upon all WTO members.
These sub-agreements and their substantive provisions, while referenced by and
subject to the general administrative organs in the WTO Agreement, are at the
same time independent normative regimes and, in the case of the plurilateral agree-
ments, are comprised of differing memberships. The WTO Agreement makes clear
that states may maintain membership in the WTO while being signatories to and
participating in either, both or none of the plurilateral agreements. Thus, states may
be members of the framework administrative agreement and fully active at the
general level of regime activity while not being a member of all WTO sub-
agreements.
This structural model of a framework administrative agreement with attached
substantive sub-agreements is representative of a modern trend in international
organizational design, with other notable examples of its use being found in the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and associated Montreal
Protocol on ozone-depleting gases, and the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change and associated Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases. It
incorporates two aspects of institutional decentralisation which are of note in con-
sideration of the potential use of this model for a restructured multilateral export
control regime system.
First, this structure provides for horizontal decentralisation, in the sense that the
existing multilateral regimes could be incorporated into the comprehensive frame-
work in much the same form in which they presently exist - that is as in many ways
separate and independent subject-material focused normative regimes. Horizontal
decentralisation is potentially useful in this context for a number of reasons. It
allows, as previously stated, for diversity of membership among the sub-regimes.
This is an important area of institutional flexibility and strength of the WTO-type
framework agreement design. While membership in the existing regimes is largely
similar, there are some notable differences in regime membership rolls which could
otherwise be extremely problematic to make allowance for in the merged regime
context. For example, Russia, traditionally one of the states of greatest concern vis-
d-vis proliferation threat, is not a member of the Australia Group. In this particu-
lar case, it is not the state that refuses accession to the regime, but the regime which,
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for a variety of reasons, has consistently refused to accept Russia as a member.
Thus, in the horizontally decentralised framework structure under consideration,
Russia could be a member of the framework administrative agreement, including
whatever compliance determination mechanisms which may be in place at that
level, and be a member of only three of the sub-regimes. This aspect of the frame-
work structure is advantageous in its inclusivity and provision of a formalised insti-
tutional structure through which to monitor compliance with regime rules, while
yet allowing for plurilateral regimes from a membership standpoint at the sub-
regime level.
Horizontal decentralisation further allows for the existing regime-centric com-
munities of specialists at both policy and technical levels to maintain feelings of
identity and institutional ownership, values that have been expressed to be import-
ant by international officials in the export control issue area. This aspect of the
framework structure contributes significantly to the political viability of the entire
enterprise of restructuring the multilateral export control regimes, and is thus of
great practical as well as theoretical value. Lastly, it allows for easier addition and
subtraction of sub-regimes with a minimum of restructuring required to the system
in the event of such changes.
The framework agreement structure also, however, incorporates vertical decen-
tralisation of authority and an almost federal-type system of multi-levelling in its
design. Again, the primary purpose of the framework agreement itself is to provide
for organs of general administration for the regime. At that level are carried out
macro-policy discussions and decisions on cross-cutting issues, inter-regime infor-
mation sharing, and regime compliance review as well as activities encouraging
issue-area cohesion and a unified institutional presence with a permanent Secre-
tariat. The sub-regime level, however, could retain a great deal of its existing com-
petencies with a renewed, formalised, documentary foundation. At this sub-regime
level could be kept the ordinary functioning of and expertise regarding the control
lists, including the authority and responsibility to regularly update lists. Intra-
regime information sharing (with the possibility of information firewalls between
sub-regimes in deference to membership differences), material-specific target lists,
and regime guidelines could be continuing facets of the sub-regimes. This again
would, from a practical standpoint, cause as little trauma to existing communities
and to the functioning of the regimes themselves as possible in the process of
restructuring. As noted, it is expected that the existing regimes would be re-
negotiated and their foundational documents significantly revised in light particu-
larly of the principles of formality and consensus voting already laid out as proposed
characteristics of the restructured regime system before taking their place as sub-
regimes within the framework structure.
Before continuing, it is important to note that the merged and restructured
framework agreement structure under consideration is not proposed to be the last
step in progression of the multilateral export control regime system. As discussed
earlier, as regime members become more supportive of yet harder, more binding
forms of institutionalisation of commitments in this issue area (that is treaties), such
support and resulting hard agreements together with their compliance enhancing
206 Daniel H. Joyner
qualities can and should supplant the informal structures proposed here. However,
it will also be noted that the framework structure which is herein discussed is
eminently qualified to act as a facilitator of this process on a number of levels. First
in terms of facilitation of the requisite level of member support for such formalis-
ing developments, the proposed regime structure should as previously discussed
contribute significantly to issue area cohesion and closer co-operation both between
states and between regimes in this area, hopefully fostering continued positive
interaction and a level of trust conducive to contemplation of yet more bindingness
of commitments. This indeed is one of the strengths of soft law structures - as
preliminary facilitators of exchange and overcoming of information barriers leading
to the creation of political will to conclude harder law structures.
Second simply in terms of institutional design, as in the case of the WTO, the
framework agreement model is easily adapted in toto into such forms of increased
formality as a treaty-based organization. Thus if in the future the time should arrive
in which the members of the restructured regime system desire to increase the for-
malisation of the norms and relationships incorporated therein, there would need
be no serious structural or functional upheavals. The job would rather fall to their
lawyers to draft the necessary documents for signature, with the work of the
regimes continuing unabated.
4 EPRM AND CDU
A couple of institutional facets of the proposed restructured regime system bear
more detailed review and explication. Within the structure of the WTO framework
agreement, two of the most novel structural elements in terms of international
organizational design are the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, both of which have been alluded to previously. The
inclusion of analogous processes, in addition to organs approximating the others
established by the WTO Agreement, in the restructured multilateral export control
regime system is proposed herein to be of great advisability.
Within the current organization of the regimes, there are no established, insti-
tutionalised processes for determining the compliance of member states with
regime rules and policies. In fact, as many policy experts in the area are quick to
point out, it is an assumption even to speak of member 'compliance' in the
context of the multilateral export control regimes. Many have asserted that
member acts and omissions in this area may at worst only be termed as not 'in
keeping with the spirit' of the regimes. This is more than a simple semantic
debate. It has reference first to the informal character of obligations undertaken
by virtue of membership in the regimes as previously discussed, but is also
importantly an indictment of the specificity of regime guidelines and the absence
of any process of authoritative interpretation of regime rules. Thus, even though
32 of the 34 members of the Nuclear Supplier's Group agreed that Russia's
shipments of fuel to the Terapur nuclear reactor in India in January 2001 were
inconsistent with Russia's NSG commitments, no authoritative mechanism
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existed by which to render an interpretation of regime guidelines and officially
sanction Russia.46
As previously stated, the restructured multilateral export control regime system
of which this article conceives, due to an existing lack of political wil to establish
harder more binding legal instruments, is proposed to be one founded on a soft law
(that is non-legally binding) documentary foundation. Thus while states under this
structure will similarly not be legally liable for non-compliance with regime rules,
the utility of instituting a process for authoritative, or official interpretation of
regime rules and for passing judgements regarding the harmony of member state
action with such established norms is proposed to be of significant worth. As dis-
cussed earlier, in the absence of vertical enforcement mechanisms the primary
guarantor of enforcement of any rule of international law currently relies upon a
horizontal system of internal and external compliance pressuring, a process in
which the enmeshing results of globalisation, issue linkages, norm internalisation
and the increasing legalisation of many aspects of international relations affect the
decisions of policymakers. Thus, while the character of norms as being derived from
hard law versus soft law instruments is not a decisive factor in determining the level
of state compliance which can be expected in reference thereto, the level of
objective legitimacy, both procedural and substantive, which the international
community perceives as being attached to a norm is an independent variable influ-
encing compliance, as it is a moving factor for the types and degree of both internal
and external compliance pressure which may be exerted upon officials of the
member states in question.
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In the context of the restructured multilateral export control regime system, this
sense of legitimacy of regime norms could be significantly enhanced by the insti-
tutionalisation of both an Export Policy Review Mechanism (EPRM) and a
Compliance Determination Understanding (CDU) (based upon the WTO's TPRM
and DSU mechanisms, though with some procedural alteration particularly with
regard to the CDU), from which could be derived official pronouncements of
interpretation and judgements regarding member state behaviour through a
mutually agreed upon procedure and according to clear standards. In support of
these determinations, it is proposed, there will be an increase in compliance pres-
suring, as clear standards are produced and official sanctioning rendered to which
both other governments and international civil society may point in their castiga-
tory rhetoric and around which they can organize more persuasive pressuring
efforts. Thus even without an increase in formal legality or bindingness of obli-
gations within the regime system, an increase of specificity and the delegation of
interpretive authority to regime structures can constitute a form of formality likely
to positively impact member compliance levels.
The main purpose of the EPRM in the multilateral export control regime
context would be to provide a unified system with harmonised standards of review
46 See US General Accounting Office, Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export
Control Regimes (2002) GAO-03-43, 23.
47 See T. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990).
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for producing reports on the export control practices of member states. This largely
informational function is a novel suggestion in that there is no currently institu-
tionalised procedure for such reviews. The work of an Export Policy Review
body, analogous to its role in the WTO context, would promote transparency in
members' export control policies and regulatory frameworks and would contribute
to general understandings regarding export controls, and would be of particular
usefulness to nations with developing export control systems. This uniform system
for review of member state export control policies would itself likely bring about
improved member compliance with regime rules, as it would bring such non-
compliances into the light of international civil societal scrutiny. It would further,
however, contribute to the functioning of the Compliance Determination Under-
standing.
As previously mentioned, one of the most significant limitations of the current
regimes is the lack of any institutional procedure through which to officially declare
a members' actions in non-compliance with its commitments and with regime rules.
In considering possible models for such a mechanism in the restructured multi-
lateral export control regime context, first to be considered would naturally be an
adversarial system such as that in place in many international organizations, includ-
ing the WTO, through which individual members who feel their interests have been
materially damaged due to another member's abrogation of regime commitments
bring such claims to an adjudicatory forum for disposition and for the awarding of
a judgement specifying remedial action on the part of a liable defendant state. This
paradigm, however, seems fairly unworkable in the restructured multilateral export
control regime context. Deficient export controls, with few exceptions, by their
nature are not easily linked to particular damage suffered by specific member states.
The damage flowing from lax or incongruent export controls is usually of a more
generalised nature, in allowing for the export from a member state of. sensitive
items which may or may not be subsequently involved in a WMD development pro-
gramme, the results of which then may or may not be proliferated either to hostile
states or terrorist entities and used against the interests of another member state.
Linking such a causal chain back to a defendant country would be an extremely
difficult task and would, if jurisdiction were linked as is usually the case to such
evidence of concrete damage, be an exercise in futility and very much in the 'too
little too late' category.
If, however, the process of compliance determination were not to be jurisdic-
tionally linked to particular damage but rather based upon the breach itself with an
understanding that any such breach contributes per se to a latent threat to inter-
national security, it would of course not be possible to award damages to a particu-
lar party. It could rather be triggered procedurally not by the presentation of one
specific aggrieved party, but upon the referral of any member state having infor-
mation upon which to base a suspicion or allegation of non-compliance. In this
sense the compliance determination process pursuant to the CDU would be more
inquisitorial than adversarial in nature, finding a better analogue in the procedures
of the UN Commission on Human Rights.
The compliance determination mechanism described above, in which the
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present or past non-compliance of a member state may be determined, should be
distinguished from the procedure for ex ante authorisation of significant exports of
sensitive goods which was an institutional feature of the Co-ordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the Cold War predecessor of the
Wassenaar Arrangement. 48 COCOM members wishing to export certain highly sen-
sitive items were required beforehand to submit an application for review and
approval by the entire COCOM membership. Unanimous member consent was
required for the export to proceed. While both this ex ante procedure and the ex post
compliance determination mechanism currently under consideration supplement
the role of norm-promulgation processes, it is simply a current reality that the like-
mindedness of membership within the regimes and the mutual identification of
threat and end users of concern have become significantly diluted due to both macro-
political changes and changes in regime membership since the disbanding of
COCOM in 1994. Thus attempting to institutionalise an ex ante procedure for license
approvals requiring unanimity among regime members, while theoretically the
most effective means of co-ordinating non-proliferation efforts, would without doubt
be an unworkable prospect in the context of a restructured multilateral regime. The
ex post system here proposed would however serve an important purpose in pro-
viding an avenue for official determinations of non-compliance and promulgation
of norms, without pushing the procedural envelope and ineffectually challenging
notions of sovereignty among increasingly un-like-minded member states.
5 CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to identify the tensions currently existing between the
expectations of many in the international security community with regard to the
role and effectiveness of the multilateral export control regime system, and
inherent structural limitations within the current regimes. It has posited that this
clash of expectations and structural limitations has produced a defining moment for
international WMD non-proliferation efforts in the area of multilateral export
controls.
In the hope of contributing to international debate on this issue, this article has
advanced the proposition that a newly merged and restructured multilateral export
control regime system incorporating some, but not all, elements of normative for-
mality could in large measure overcome these structural limitations and contribute
to the more effective functioning of the regime system in carrying out its vital role
in international security, while at the same time remaining grounded in political
reality and in an understanding of the particular characteristics of the multilateral
export control issue area.
48 See R.T. Cupitt and S.R. Grillot, COCOM is Dead, Long Live COCOM: Persistence and
Change in Multilateral Security Institutions (1997) 27 British Journal of Political Science 361;
K. Dursht, 'From Containment to Cooperation: Collective Action and the Wasscnaar
Arrangement' (1997) 19 Cardozo L Rev. 1098.
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It has further posited that an organizational structure analogous to that
designed in the agreements establishing the WTO would offer many structural
advantages and utilities as an institutional framework for this restructured regime,
including through the maintenance of a specially designed Export Policy Review
Mechanism and Compliance Determination Understanding aimed at producing
official interpretations of regime norms and determinations of member state com-
pliance with agreed commitments.
In discussions with governmental officials during the writing of this article, it has
become clear that there are currently two primary hindrances to the restructuring
of the multilateral export control regimes along lines similar to those outlined
herein. The first is the strong sense that many officials in regime circles feel and
manifest regarding the maintenance of the status quo in this area, a sense that is no
doubt wedded at least partially to their own personal investments of time in
working within the existing regime frameworks and developing of regime-specific
expertise, and to their having obtained influential positions in their national govern-
ments by virtue thereof.
The second is the lack of momentum currently present within national govern-
ments to bring about a newly restructured regime which, although concededly
offering significant points of added value, has not yet received the mandate of
catastrophe. Meaning of course that there has not yet occurred a WMD event of
the location and magnitude necessary to martial political will at high enough levels
of government to allow such a restructuring to be pushed through bureaucratic
channels. While the first hinderance described above is understandable and
expected in any new endeavour of regime engineering, the second is more
troubling.
It is a fact that international organizations in the security context have a history
of being one generation too late to in fact perform the functions for which they are
designed. The League of Nations was instituted, for example, in order to establish
a procedural system of checks and limitations purposed to prevent the sorts of mis-
communications from occurring which were thought to have precipitated the First
World War, but were not in fact the primary modern threat, and thus not well dealt
with under the League of Nations Covenant system. The United Nations Charter
as well was established with a firm grasp of the sorts of normative protections and
frameworks which might have been useful had they been instituted in 1938, but
which fairly soon after the charter's establishment began to be criticised as being
insufficient to cover more modern security realities.
It is unfortunate that the multilateral export control regime system seems
destined to suffer the same fate, and that there is not enough farsightedness among
government circles not just to act reflexively to calamities in their international
institution building, but to proactively seek to prevent them ex ante by engaging in
the sorts of relatively simple institutional reworkings considered herein. It is the
more disturbing because the technologies which the multilateral export control
regimes seek to regulate, and which they might more effectively control if properly
institutionally endowed, are even less allowing of institutional amendment ex post
than are the use of force regimes previously mentioned. In the field of WMD
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proliferation, it is not prudentially sound to try and get things right the second time
around.
Thus, it is this article's contention that national policymakers should in this area
particularly heed the advice of Benjamin Franklin, and commit themselves sooner
rather than too late to a course of consideration and proactive implementation of
measures to strengthen the multilateral export control system. It is hoped that the
prescriptions for structural change as herein discussed may contribute to that con-
sideration.

